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CEP AL REVIEW No. 26 
The Latin American 
periphery in 
the global crisis 
of capitalism 
Raúl Prebisch* 
Capitalism is in the throes of a profound crisis deriving 
from the social changes accompanying the evolution 
of technology and its contradictions. These changes 
find expression in dynamic disequilibria which affect 
the internal economies of both the central and the 
peripheral countries, as well as centre-periphery rela-
tions. An analysis of these disequilibria constitutes the 
nucleus of the article (sections n and in), which then 
puts forward considerations relating to the crisis of 
conventional economic ideas (section iv) and ends by 
outlining a policy to grapple with the current crisis. 
From the standpoint of the periphery, correction 
of the external disequilibrium calls for wariness to-
wards recommendations thai encourage trade and 
Financial "openness", and for paramount emphasis on 
import substitution at the subregional and regional 
levels and on the establishment of a new overall 
framework for renegotiation of the external debt, in-
volving a considerable extension of maturity periods 
and reduction of interest rates. 
The internal disequilibrium, in its turn, cannot be 
overcome unless the appropriation, accumulation and 
distribution of income are radically transformed by 
means of macroeconomic regulation of the global sur-
plus through a democratic process in which all social 
groups take part, in particular those which have been 
left without a share in the fruits of development. This 
is a problem that both in theory and above all in prac-
tice is extremely hard to solve. But there is no other 
way of facing up to the crisis, since the play of market 
laws and a purely monetary policy have shown them-
selves impotent to tackle the dilemmas of today with 
lasting success. 
*I)irector, CKPAI. Review. 
I 
A global view 
of the crisis 
1. The vigour of capitalism 
and the weakening of its dynamic force 
We are living through a worldwide crisis of 
capitalism. The evolution of technology and its 
effects on the structure of society, along with its 
contradictions, have brought with them new and 
complex phenomena which had never before 
occurred in the development of the system and 
now go beyond the bounds of the theories 
formulated in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. The capitalism of today is in fact very 
different from that of the past, both in the cen-
tres and in the periphery, which are integral 
parts of one and the same system. This crisis in 
the Latin American sphere can only be un-
derstood within the global context of the system. 
After rates of development so high as to be 
unprecedented in the history of capitalism, the 
reversal of the trend is a matter of grave concern. 
It seems unlikely that these rates will return in 
what remains of this decade or even beyond it. 
Unemployment obstinately persists, despite cer-
tain improvements, and there has unavoidably 
been a regression in social services and at best a 
postponement of the hope of raising the real 
income of broad strata of the population. 
What is happening in capitalism? Is it that, 
after enormous capital accumulation, especially 
in the centres, the notable capacity for expansion 
which prevailed until a short time ago has been 
lost? Far from it; I believe that this crisis is rather 
a consequence of the vigour of capitalism, of its 
ceaseless technological innovations, of its proved 
ability to extend material well-being to great mas-
ses of people. 
The mutations in the structure of society and 
in power relations which accompany the evolu-
tion of technology, coupled with the con-
tradictions arising from its ambivalence, are driv-
ing present-day capitalism into disequilibria un-
known in those earlier times. 
In this paper we shall mention two basic 
disequilibria which jeopardize the economic sur-
plus and consequently the accumulation of re-
productive capital, and end by plunging the sys-
tem into crisis: the internal disequilibrium with 
its adverse effect on the rate of accumulation, 
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detrimentally to the multiplication of employ-
ment, productivity and income (whence stems 
the internal vulnerability of the process), and the 
imbalance in relations between the centres and 
the periphery, which the latter tries to correct 
through the export of manufactures, thus in turn 
giving rise to external vulnerability of the 
economic surplus. 
To this must be added a phenomenon of 
great importance: the elimination of the gold 
standard which characterized capitalism in the 
past. This standard, with all its faults, imposed a 
monetary discipline, which does not exist in con-
temporary capitalism, subject as it is to all the 
ups-and-downs of the dollar in its double role of 
national and international currency. 
I am far from claiming that my explanation 
of the crisis is exhaustive. I merely stress the 
influence of technology and its contradictions. 
This is a presentation which, being schematic, 
omits special cases and circumstantial factors. 
2. The internal vulnerability of the surplus 
I have referred in the first place to the accumula-
tion of reproductive capital. This process is based 
on the capacity of certain higher groups in the 
social structure to appropriate and retain a major 
part of the fruits of the technical progress re-
flected in the steady increase of productivity. 
This is the meaning of the economic surplus. A 
meaning eminently dynamic, since the surplus 
has always been and still is the primary source of 
reproductive accumulation. 
It is a matter not only of the appropriation of 
a lion's share of the fruits of technical progress 
but also of its persistent retention in these higher 
groups. The development of capitalism has not 
been characterized by the social diffusion of 
these fruits through a fall in prices correlative 
with the rise in productivity; in the interplay of 
the market only a partial distribution to the 
labour force takes place. This has had highly 
important internal consequences for the dy-
namics of capitalism, one of which is the present 
crisis, since the surplus has become vulnerable to 
the detriment of the system's capacity to expand. 
In the system's past, the surplus seemed in-
vulnerable. And now we see that this was only a 
phase in the development of the system or, so to 
speak, of a historical category. The labour force 
was passive and entirely subject to the rule of 
market laws; it did not dispute the power of the 
advantaged groups to appropriate a large share 
of the fruits of technical progress. Nor was the 
State moved by considerations of redistribution; 
as far as the free play of market forces was con-
cerned, it was a laissez-faire State. 
The progressive strengthening of the redis-
tributive power of the labour force and of the 
State is an expression of the changes which occur 
in the social structure and power relations as 
technology evolves and penetrates that structure, 
and democratization gains momentum. 
Thus there develops a distribution struggle 
which ends by weakening the growth rate of the 
surplus and with the passage of time leads to the 
crisis of the system. But this is not all: the evolu-
tion of technology brings with it great con-
tradictions too. Among these are, on the one 
hand, the technological innovations which in-
crease the actual quantity of goods and services 
themselves, and, on the other, those which di-
versify them more and more, creating new de-
signs or new types of goods and services. And all 
this is fostered by the mass communication and 
social propaganda techniques. 
Thus to the weakening of the growth rate of 
the surplus by the distribution struggle we must 
add the persistent incentive to consume at the 
expense of the dynamics of the system. Hence 
arises a growing tendency to disequilibrium be-
tween the rate of expenditure (including non-
reproductive investment) and the rate of repro-
ductive capital accumulation. And this has an 
adverse effect on the growth rate of employ-
ment, income and productivity. 
The dynamics of the system depends, then, 
on the growth of the surplus and this, in its turn, 
is based on social inequality. And when the evolu-
tion of the system tries to correct this inequality, 
the end result is internal vulnerability of the sur-
plus and a decline in the rate of reproductive 
accumula t ion , with ser ious dynamic con-
sequences. Obviously, if technical progress in-
creases production, its purpose is to increase con-
sumption. It is not there that the root of the 
problem lies, but in the tendency of consumption 
to grow faster than accumulation. 
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3. The external vulnerability of the surplus 
The surplus used to be invulnerable thanks also 
to the passivity of the primary-producer coun-
tries. Because of the very dynamics of the system 
these c o u n t r i e s had not yet achieved in-
dustrialization. This was the origin of the periph-
ery in the global system of capitalism. 
With the fragmentation of the periphery, 
which had no dynamics of its own, large masses 
of its population were left on the sidelines of 
development. But the periphery is becoming in-
dustrialized and has succeeded in exporting 
manufactures based on relatively less advanced 
techniques, which compete with those of the cen-
tres, mainly thanks to lower prices. This creates 
an incipient external vulnerability of the surplus 
which, although not yet a major factor, aggravate 
the effects of the internal vulnerability. 
Faced with this external vulnerability, which 
is only just emerging, the centres resort to impos-
ing restrictions, in one way or another, on im-
ports from the periphery. And they deprive this 
latter of the resources needed to satisfy its grow-
ing demand for imports of diversified and tech-
nically advanced goods which it cannot yet pro-
duce owing to the tune-lag in its industrialization 
or to the lack of natural resources for the inputs 
of such goods. In this way the trend towards 
external dynamic disequilibrium is superim-
posed on the effects of the in te rna l dis-
equilibrium of the periphery, thus reducing the 
speed of its development. 
The fact is that with a productivity lower than 
that of the centres, the periphery tends to imitate 
their patterns of consumption, especially in re-
spect of technically advanced goods. The Latin 
American countries are anything but austere, so 
that the trend towards internal imbalance is more 
pronounced than it was in the centres at a similar 
stage of their development. The two disequilibria 
are closely linked. 
4. The waste of productive resources 
Neither the centres, nor much less the periph-
ery, have found a solution to the internal dynam-
ic disequilibrium, which ultimately culminates in 
a new type of inflation that did not arise in the 
capitalism of the past and which cannot be hand-
led now with the monetary instrument. The 
monetary instrument is an anachronism: it pro-
vokes or accentuates unemployment without 
correcting the basic factors of disequilibrium. So 
it is not surprising to come across the peculiar 
argument that an appreciable unemployment 
coefficient must be maintained in order to lessen 
the distribution struggle; in other words, to re-
vert to those times when the labour force was 
passive and the State unconcerned. Could this be 
called optimum use of productive resources? 
Again, the external defence of the surplus by 
the centres, by the application of all sorts of res-
trictions on imports from the periphery, is an-
other counterproductive method of tackling this 
problem, since it deprives centres and peripheral 
countries alike of the acknowledged advantage 
of international trade. 
It is not just the crisis of the global system of 
capitalism that is in question. It is also a crisis of 
ideas and forms of action which have manifestly 
been overtaken by events. 
5. The macroeconomic regulation of the system 
It is not possible to retrace our steps and return to 
a passive labour force and a laissez-faire State in 
order to restore the invulnerability of the sur-
plus. Nor yet to diffuse the surplus in such a way 
that the fruits of technical progress are socially 
distributed through a fall in prices. Capitalism 
has never functioned like that. There has always 
been a surplus; the praxis of the system has not 
accorded with conventional theories, however 
much their validity may have been asserted. 
To solve the problem the primary requisite is 
that the surplus perform as effectively as possible 
its dynamic role, which is to step up the rate of 
accumulation and employ with increasing pro-
ductivity and ever-rising incomes the increment 
of the labour force as well as the manpower 
which has been relegated with lower productivity 
to the bottom of the social structure. Social use of 
the economic surplus is essential. 
This calls for macroeconomic regulation of 
the rate of expenditure and the rate of accumula-
tion; in other words, we must not assign to pres-
ent consumption the grain which should be set 
aside as seed for the expansion of production. 
Is the surplus to be raised so as to increase its 
accumulation by the social groups at present 
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favoured under the system? Or should accumu-
lation be concentrated in the hands of the State? 
Or are we to allow the labour force a share in the 
process, thereby fomenting the social diffusion 
of capital? These are questions of fundamental 
importance for the transformation ofthe system 
if dynamic efficacy and distributive equity are to 
be fully achieved. 
6. The primordial role of the market 
It is imperative to raise productivity if this 
transformation is to be economically and socially 
successful. But it is not enough to strengthen the 
rate of reproductive accumulation. It is equally 
essential to take full advantage ofthe productive 
potential of capital and labour, both through en-
trepreneurial initiative, and through the increas-
ing skills of the labour force, whose contribution 
to production is also indispensable. Of primary 
importance in all this is the role of economic 
incentive in every participant in this process. 
If the transformation of the system is to be 
tackled with vigour there must be a rational com-
bination of the social use of the surplus and the 
positive elements of the market, simultaneously 
correcting the negative factors stemming from 
the contradictions of technology and promoting 
entrepreneurial competition. 
This crisis of capitalism is a crisis of accumu-
lation and not ofthe market, despite the negative 
elements and flaws in its operation. 
7. Crisis of capitalism 
and crisis of socialism in practice 
Capitalism is centripetal in the play of market 
forces. Its dynamics is based on the concentration 
in private hands of a large part of the fruits of 
technical progress in the form of surplus. But the 
mutations of the social structure help to give 
impetus to democratization and to the pro-
gressive evolution of individual liberties, among 
them entrepreneurial freedom and the role of 
incentive, which have such a marked influence 
on the steady stepping-up of productivity. 
This process and the dynamics ofthe system 
itself bring about likewise a centrifugal trend to-
wards diffusion of the fruits in question which 
ends by jeopardizing the growth of the surplus. 
This is the source of the crisis of accumulation 
and distr ibution. Democratization requires, 
therefore, that this process be transformed. 
In socialism in practice the surplus is 
appropriated by the State and retained in its 
hands , a situation which invests those who 
dominate the system with invincible economic 
and political power. By virtue of this concentra-
tion, decisions on what is to be produced and 
what consumed are taken at the summit of the 
system, de t r imen ta l l y —as its leaders in-
creasingly recognize— to freedom of initiative on 
the part of enterprises and to productivity in-
centives, with the result that the dynamic role of 
the surplus is affected. The crisis of socialism in 
practice is, then, a crisis of productivity. 
Accordingly, a question of vital importance 
comes to the fore. To what extent would a de-
mocratization process which, apart from its in-
trinsic significance, boosts entrepreneurial free-
dom and the play of incentives, be compatible 
with this concentration of power at the summit of 
the system? 
8. The vicissitudes of the dollar and the crisis 
The tendencies towards disequilibrium arising 
from the evolution of the system are aggravated 
by the fiscal and monetary indiscipline of the 
leading dynamic centre of capitalism. The in-
ternational consequences of all this are closely 
linked with the double role of the dollar as 
national and international currency. We cannot 
conclude this preliminary overview of the crisis 
without referring to so vital an aspect of the sub-
ject. 
It is hard to produce gold. Herein lay the 
relatively stabilizing virtue of the gold standard, 
notwithstanding its flaws. The liquidation ofthe 
gold standard helped to give the dollar its pres-
ent role as international currency. The dollar is 
produced with no difficulty at all, which implies 
conferring on the producer country the privilege 
of creating it, and at the same time the responsi-
bility for doing so correctly. 
The internal inflation resulting first from 
the dynamic disequilibrium in the leading centre 
of capitalism and aggravated subsequently by the 
rise in oil prices, prevented the regulation of the 
creation of the dollar as international currency. 
The internal inflation has spilled over into the 
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rest of the world, spreading the bonanza during 
those long years which ended halfway through 
the 1970s. 
And now we are witnessing the opposite phe-
nomenon: that of the flow of dollars towards the 
country in question, attracted above all by the 
high rates of interest deriving from its type of 
anti-inflationary policy. This has produced the 
economic crisis of the rest of the world, 
accentuating domestic factors which help to pro-
voke recession. 
All this has serious implications for in-
ternational trade. First, the inflationary euphoria 
liberalized the centres' trade; and now the reces-
sion and the suction of dollars from the whole of 
the capitalist world are seriously disturbing this 
1. The structural origin of the surplus 
The appropriation of the economic surplus is a 
structural phenomenon, since it is in view of the 
heterogeneous structure of society that the 
possession of the means of production enables 
their owners to appropriate a large part of the 
productivity increment resulting from technical 
progress. The successive innovations in which 
this progress manifests itself do not spread sim-
ultaneously throughout the economy; new tech-
nical layers with higher productivity are super-
imposed on earlier technical layers with lower 
productivity, and tend to eliminate the latter. 
This is the dynamic process in which capital 
accumulation plays a fundamental role (in re-
spect both of physical goods and of manpower 
training). 
In the play of market laws» enterprises re-
quire personnel to cope with the higher-
productivity technical innovations incorporated 
by new capital investment. This demand mainly 
favours those groups which possess the increas-
ing skills required by technology (including those 
trade, encouraging protectionism and upsetting 
the functioning of the multilateral régime. 
But this is not all. The international abund-
ance of this currency in that first phase of bonan-
za created the Eurodollar market; and this, in the 
absence of any regulation, has provoked the phe-
nomena whose serious consequences are now 
manifest. To the fiscal and monetary indiscipline 
of the United States has been added in-
ternational financial indiscipline, with very 
adverse effects on all countries, especially on the 
Latin American periphery. 
The reform of the international monetary 
system poses, then, a problem much more pro-
found than the reconditioning of a mechanism. 
It is a problem of power relations on the in-
ternational plane. 
concerned with the more and more complex 
organization of the production processes). The 
supply is naturally limited in these groups and 
the labour force concerned has the capacity to 
share spontaneously in the productivity incre-
ment. Lower down in the scale of skills, however, 
the supply of labour becomes relatively abun-
dant. Thus, as this labour force is employed in 
new technical layers of increasing productivity, 
the comparatively plentiful supply precludes a 
corresponding rise in its remuneration. 
We have described as economic surplus that 
part of the productivity increment which, owing 
to this regressive competition, is transferred to 
the labour force only partially or not at all, and 
thus remains in the hands of the owners of the 
means of production. 
Accordingly the generation of the surplus is 
affected by market laws (manpower supply and 
demand) and by the heterogeneity of the social 
structure. It should be noted that the surplus, 
which ultimately derives from technical prog-
ress, comprises profit, interest on capital and 
land rent. 
II 
The trend towards internal dynamic disequilibrium 
and the inflationary process 
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It must also be stressed that the surplus is 
augmented by profits which originate not di-
rectly in technical progress but in frequent de-
viations from market laws, such as internal or 
international restrictions on competition, in 
addition to inflationary swelling of the surplus. 
All this helps to exacerbate the distribution 
struggle. 
In this structural heterogeneity the distribu-
tion of power is of vital impor tance . T h e 
appropriation of the surplus by the privileged 
social groups is based on the economic power to 
do so, conferred by their ownership of the means 
of production, and the political power to protect 
the process. This is not to deny the importance of 
individual aptitudes in the generation of the sur-
plus. Similarly, differences in social power carry 
considerable weight in the acquisition of the di-
verse skills required by technical progress in the 
production of goods and services. And this social 
power is combined with the aptitudes exhibited 
by individuals in the vast gamut of activities. 
Be that as it may, the intensity of the genera-
tion of the surplus depends, on the one hand, on 
the rate of accumulation of reproductive capital 
which is invested successively in new technical 
layers, and on the other, on the labour force 
which remains in lower-productivity layers and 
on the growth rate of the labour force. 
Such, in very schematic terms, is the nature 
of the accumulat ion process based on the 
economic surplus. T h e techniques which in-
creasingly raise productivity generate in their 
turn the accumulation of reproductive capital, 
which makes it possible to incorporate new tech-
niques and increase productivity: this is the 
dynamic sequence of the system based on the 
surplus. 
2. The weakening of the growth rate 
of the surplus and of the efficacy of its use 
T h e dynamics of the surplus tends to weaken in 
the course of development. In the first place, the 
penetration of technology goes hand in hand 
with continuous changes in the structure of soci-
ety and in the power relations which arise from 
these. And, secondly, the evolution of technology 
presents serious contradictions. All this tends to 
weaken the aforesaid dynamic sequence. The 
rate of accumulation has an adverse influence on 
that of productivity, and vice versa. And thus the 
rate of multiplication of employment and income 
likewise declines. 
In the earlier days of capitalism the power of 
the groups obtaining the lion's share of the fruits 
of technical progress was predominant. Howev-
er, the structural mutations manifest themselves, 
inter alia, in a change in power relations. Thus, 
with the advance of democratization in the grow-
ing urban conglomerates which are characteristic 
of capitalism, and in which the structural muta-
tions of employment are most in evidence, the 
trade-union and political power of the labour 
force sprouts and develops, although with great 
disparities, since the labour force is far from be-
ing homogeneous, as are also the social groups 
favoured by the surplus. Be that as it may, this 
twofold power obstructs the power of appropria-
tion of the surplus which was formerly the un-
disputed prerogative of the owners of the means 
of production. In this way the labour force 
pushes up the rate of its private consumption, 
along with its social consumption via the State. In 
other words, the labour force tends to raise its 
real income above what is due to it in accordance 
with market laws and the dynamic need to in-
crease the surplus and with it the rate of accumu-
lation. 
The same effect occurs when the State, in 
addition to this and other forms of redistribu-
tion in favour of the labour force, expands its 
functions to the detriment of the growth rate of 
the surplus, in so far as these do not contribute to 
the productivity increment. The State plays its 
part either by increasing the taxes and charges 
which fall on the labour force and which the 
latter strives to recoup, or by taxing the surplus. 
In either case the consequences are much the 
same. 
The changes in power relations have great 
dynamic importance. In the structural stages in 
which the power of the higher strata is pre-
eminent, there is nothing to hamper the growth 
of the surplus except cyclical or accidental fac-
tors: the labour force lacks redistributive power 
and the State is unconcerned with redistribution. 
The surplus is invulnerable. This is not the case 
when the aforesaid changes in power relations 
supervene and are intensified. 
The significance of these changes cannot be 
understood without probing into the social sig-
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nificance of the surplus. The surplus is a clear 
expression of a basic distributive inequality. And 
in the evolution of the system the labour force 
tries to correct this inequality by raising its wages 
above what is in keeping with the play of market 
forces. In its turn the State, impelled by the polit-
ical power of labour, concedes increasing social 
advantages and employs manpower which, ow-
ing to insufficient accumulation and other fac-
tors, cannot find employment in the open mar-
ket. Thus attempts are made to correct the es-
sential inequality of the system. 
A distinction must be drawn, however, be-
tween this social objective and the means em-
ployed to achieve it: means which sooner or later 
lead to the crisis of the system. 
3. The contradictions of technology 
This crisis is a manifestation not only of the vul-
nerability of the surplus but also of the way in 
which it is used, that is, of the proportion of the 
surplus and of income in general that is allocated 
to reproductive accumulation. Here we are up 
against the contradictions of technology. What 
are these contradictions? They are of different 
types. 
Let us look first at those which continually 
stimulate consumption. While there are technical 
innovations operating to raise the quantity of 
goods, others supervene which arouse consumer 
aspirations at a faster rate. These latter are those 
techniques which in different ways provoke an 
increase in demand through the incessant di-
versification of the same goods and services and 
the creation of new ones. All this is due to the 
portentous evolution of techniques of propaga-
tion of these consumer aspirations and of com-
munication techniques. 
T h e increase in consumption which thus 
occurs first manifests itself in the upper strata, 
both in consumer expendi ture and in non-
reproductive investments of a recreational and 
ostentatious character, and subsequently in the 
lower social strata, in proportion to the growth of 
labour's redistributive power, although naturally 
with diminished force. Thus these diverse forms 
of private and social consumption continue to 
appear one after another, no one type benefiting 
at the expense of the rest, but at the expense of 
the rate of accumulation. To this must be added 
State expenditure and investment, which, even if 
in part reproductive, affect the surplus of the 
enterprises. 
In the old days of capitalism the social effica-
cy of the accumulation process depended basical-
ly on the prevailing degree of austerity; that is, on 
the proportion of the economic surplus which 
was devoted to reproductive accumulation instead 
of to consumption. The more intensive the 
accumulation, the deeper was the penetration of 
productive technology which raised the pro-
ductivity and income of all the strata until it 
.reached the lowest groups. 
However this may have occurred in those 
past times, it is certain that today the growth of 
consumption, stimulated by diversification, is a 
considerable obstacle to capital accumulation, 
the consequences of which are manifest in the 
trend towards dynamic disequilibrium which 
characterizes contemporary capitalism in gen-
eral. 
In underlining the influence of diversifica-
tion on the rate of accumulation we cannot omit 
to mention the Keynesian thesis on the tendency 
of the system to generate an excess of saving, 
which is a very different thesis from that of 
dynamic disequilibrium set forth in these pages. 
When Keynes began to write his general theory, 
at a time of worldwide depression, diversification 
had not attained the dimensions which it later 
reached. It was therefore conceivable that the 
relatively slow growth of consumption would cre-
ate an imbalance between the rate of expenditure 
and that of reproductive accumulation opposite 
to that which was to appear later in the system. 
How is it possible, then, despite Keynes' acute 
intellectual insight, to suppose that he could anti-
cipate the momentous technological innovations 
which caused a flood of private and social con-
sumption to the detriment of the system's saving 
and its own dynamics? 
In addition to the contradictions between the 
techniques which increase the quantity of goods 
and those which diversify them, there are other 
contradictions which we shall go on to mention 
next. I refer in the first place to the evergrowing 
contradiction resulting from the ambivalence of 
those techniques which raise productivity but at 
the same time signify pollution of the environ-
ment and irresponsible exploitation of non-
renewable natural resources. The effort to cor-
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rect this ecological damage generally implies the 
investment of more capital per unit of produc-
tion, and the same happens with the results of 
scientific and technological advances in relation 
to population growth. 
4. The dynamic disequilibrium 
in peripheral capitalism 
The dynamics of the system rests, then, on the 
structural inequality wherein the surplus is 
generated. And in the course of development 
this surplus becomes vulnerable, prejudicially to 
the intensity of reproductive accumulation. 
The foregoing explanations concerning the 
vulnerability of the surplus and of the accumula-
tion process in the course of structural change 
relate to capitalism in general. It is very im-
portant, however, to note the great differences, 
in relation to the centres, which occur in pe-
ripheral capitalism, owing mainly to the time-lag 
in its development and to its eminently imitative 
nature. 
In contemporary capitalism there is a very 
pronounced structural heterogeneity in the pe-
riphery compared with that of the centres, which 
has been diminishing in the course of develop-
ment. Thus, in the periphery, notwithstanding 
the differences between countries, there is still a 
very great diversity of technical layers and pro-
ductivity. And the proportion of the labour force 
in lower-productivity layers is considerable, as 
well as population growth. Consequently, as 
technical layers of high productivity are in-
corporated, a bigger proportion of the fruits of 
increased productivity than in the centres is not 
transferred to the labour force employed in 
those and is therefore retained in the enterprises 
in the form of surplus under the sway of market 
laws. 
If the capitalism of the periphery were aus-
tere, this larger relative surplus would permit a 
high rate of reproductive accumulation, giving 
greater impetus to the dynamics of the system. 
But this is not the case, and the marked tendency 
to imitate the centres' advanced patterns of con-
sumption is a serious obstacle to reproductive 
accumulation. High consumption and invest-
ment of a recreational and ostentatious character 
in the privileged consumer society of the upper 
strata: this is the dominant feature of the social 
structure of the periphery. And as the labour 
force improves its income, both through market 
laws and through its redistributive power, it 
naturally tends to increase its private and social 
consumption, which is superimposed on the priv-
ileged expenditure of the upper strata. This 
redistributive power manifests itself much ear-
lier than it did in the corresponding stage of 
structural change in the centres. In other words, 
the time-lag in development and in the in-
corporation of technical progress does not sig-
nify a lag in imitation of the patterns of consump-
tion: quite the contrary. 
With regard to State expenditure, its volume 
tends to be relatively higher than that of the 
centres at similar stages of their development. 
This hypertrophy of the State is a factor in the 
lower rate of accumulation, although part of the 
State expenditure and investment contributes in 
one way or another to a rise in productivity. 
This is the reason why the trend towards an 
internal dynamic imbalance between the rate of 
expenditure and that of reproductive accumula-
tion, accentuated by the high rate of population 
growth, appears prematurely in the periphery in 
comparison with what happened in the centres at 
similar stages of their structural evolution, and 
why the social inflation stemming from this phe-
nomenon has also occurred earlier and also ac-
quired much greater dimensions. 
5. The retention of the surplus 
Why does this dynamic disequilibrium manifest 
itself in a new type of inflation which had never 
made its appearance before? Put another way: 
why does this imbalance not manifest itself sim-
ply in a slackening of the rate of employment, 
productivity and income, i.e., in a reduced dynam-
ics of the system without the emergence of 
inflation? This question cannot be answered sat-
isfactorily without elucidation of another mat-
ter of unquestionable importance. We have 
explained above that the economic surplus 
stemmed from the heterogeneity of the social 
structure in which the power of the higher 
strata, which own the greater part of the means 
of production, enables them to appropriate 
a large part of the fruits of the growing pro-
ductivity of the system. In that case, if the surplus 
is appropriated in this way, why is there no 
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tendency for competition among enterprises to 
be diffused socially through a fall in prices? 
This does not happen, however. If this mys-
tery has not been cleared up it is perhaps due to 
the line of reasoning relating to the individual 
enterprise. If there is a surplus in an enterprise 
owing to greater productivity, competition will 
push up the production of this enterprise or of 
others and eliminate the surplus: all that would 
remain would be the remuneration of the en-
trepreneurs. If this happens in an individual en-
terprise, why does not the same thing occur in the 
enterprises as a whole? Why is the argument 
relating to the microeconomy not transposed to 
the macroeconomy? 
We shall attempt to explain this. To increase 
output the individual entrepreneur has to raise 
employment in the course of the production pro-
cess, and the additional income thus generated 
filters through the whole economy without per-
ceptibly increasing demand for the goods man-
ufactured by this enterprise. 
In contrast, if the enterprises are taken as a 
whole, the growth of the production in process 
characteristic of the dynamics of the system 
generates an increase in income which results in 
an increase in global market demand. This in-
crease in demand created by the growth of the 
production of goods in process which will enter 
the market later on is what permits the absorp-
tion of the productivity increment incorporated 
in the finished goods that constitute current 
supply. If this were not so, demand would be 
insufficient to absorb the productivity incre-
ment, thus causing a fall in prices. 
But in the growth of production time is of 
great importance. In effect, the incomes which 
are paid out in the production in process in order 
to obtain finished goods later on generate an 
increase in demand as a result of the additional 
employment and the rise in wages in the play of 
market forces. This increase in demand does not 
wait for the subsequent appearance of the re-
spective finished goods, but is directed at the 
goods finished today, so to speak, without prices 
being brought down by the corresponding pro-
ductivity increment. Hence the productivity in-
crement remains in the enterprises in the form of 
surplus and is added to that which had been 
generated before. 
In fact, the surplus is generated bit by bit in 
the different layers of production in process. In 
this way the global surplus is built up, which is 
incorporated into global demand together with 
the income corresponding to the labour force. 
Consequently, in the course of the growth of 
global production in the system there are two 
variables of prime importance: on the one hand, 
the increment in demand deriving from the in-
come corresponding to the increase in the pro-
duction in process of future goods, and, on the 
other, the productivity increment in the supply 
of current goods. 
6. Social inflation 
It is obvious that if this increase in demand deriv-
ing from income were to exceed the productivity 
increment in the production in process, prices 
would tend to rise. 
Here the monetary authority plays its part, 
since it is responsible for the creation of money 
with which the enterprises have to pay the in-
crease in wages. Such is the regulatory function 
which is entrusted to it. The evolution of capital-
ism has in this case also brought about major 
changes in the fulfilment of this task. 
What is it that ensures equivalence between 
the rise in demand in a determined period and 
the increase in the supply of goods existing in the 
same period, augmented by the greater pro-
ductivity? We cannot answer this question with-
out a brief reference to the cycle, which is the 
growth pattern of the capitalist economy. In the 
ascending phase of the cycle the growth of de-
mand tends to exceed that of supply owing to the 
rise in employment and wages in the play of 
market forces. Hence prices go up and the sur-
plus increases more than productivity: these are 
increases of a transitory nature. The central 
banks, responsible for monetary stability, try to 
prevent the rise in prices from exceeding mod-
erate limits in order to palliate, if not ward off, 
internal and external pressures in the system. 
When these limits are overstepped, the banks will 
follow a restrictive policy which curbs the ascend-
ing phase and provokes a cyclical downturn by 
reversing the earlier movements. 
A descent might also occur through the 
evolution of the phenomenon itself. Thus when 
the enterprises, instead of using a part of the 
surplus in accumulation which is gradually 
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soaked up in the cyclical process, allocate it to 
payment of income in the production in process, 
as a result of which there is no corresponding 
increase in demand to absorb the productivity 
increment, a fall in prices occurs. 
In my earlier writings on this subject I have 
referred to another important aspect which I 
merely mention here in passing so as not to com-
plicate the issue. The increase in income deriving 
from production in process is not all immediately 
transformed into demand for Final goods, but is 
diverted towards services. When the cyclical de-
scent occurs, this demand returns to goods and 
contributes to the reactivation of the economy, 
which brings about a new upturn. 
The monetary authority has a difficult role 
to play. It has gradually acquired experience in 
the task of regulation, not without failures as in 
the Great Depression, which originated in the 
main dynamic centre of capitalism. The Key-
nesian innovation is explained by this failure in 
regulatory action. 
Be that as it may, in contemporary capital-
ism, in which the labour force has considerable 
trade-union and political power, and the State no 
longer adopts a laissez-faire policy, the monetary 
authority encounters problems which it had nev-
er had to face before. 
In the capitalism of the past, when through 
market forces or incipient trade-union power 
wages rose beyond the level determined by the 
market and prices went up, the monetary author-
ity had sufficient power to bring wages down 
again or even prevent them from rising by means 
of restriction. Monetary regulation was effective. 
But in modern capitalism a veritable con-
frontation of powers has arisen : on the one hand, 
the redistributive power of the labour force; on 
the other, the regulatory power of the monetary 
authority. If wages rise through trade-union 
power and the monetary authority is firm in 
applying its policy of restraint, enterprises will 
not be able to raise both employment and wages. 
They will therefore be forced to sacrifice the 
former in order to pay the increase in wages. 
This raises their costs and prices. An inflationary 
spiral follows, together with unemployment. 
The monetary authority has considerable 
theoretical support for this policy: the support of 
the conventional theories which consider that 
trade-union power represents a violation of mar-
ket laws, just as does exaggerated growth of the 
State. This theoretical support in its turn coin-
cides in the main with the interests of the domi-
nant groups. And if the monetary authority tena-
ciously persists in the severity of this policy, a 
time will come when the volume of unemploy-
ment will end by destroying trade-union power. 
In previous articles we have enlarged on 
these topics. The growth of demand can also 
derive from the abuse of credit directed towards 
consumption or investment, i.e., patterns of ear-
lier capitalism which are reproduced in current 
capitalism and increase the inflationary spiral. 
Similarly, the fiscal deficit tends to soar, as is 
generally a sign of internal dynamic dis-
equilibrium. Sometimes an attempt is made to 
tackle it by counterproductive credit restraint, 
particularly when trade-union power is strong. 
Here we confine ourselves to a brief account of 
how the mechanism of retention operates, and 
how, when it exceeds its bounds to the detriment 
of the surplus, the monetary authority attempts 
to correct it at considerable economic and social 
cost: the cost of the recovery of the surplus 
through unemployment. 
If that were a final solution of the problem of 
dynamic disequilibrium this cost of a restrictive 
monetary policy might perhaps be justified. But 
this is not so. There is a need for other forms of 
macroeconomic regulation of the system. 
Of course the employment of force by the 
State to defeat trade-union power has also failed 
to solve this problem, as Latin American ex-
perience shows. And its political cost, in addition 
to its economic and social cost, is enormous. 
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III 
Centre-periphery relations and their trend 
towards disequilibrium 
1. The time-lag in peripheral development 
In earlier pages we have attributed a decisive 
influence on the dynamics of development to the 
fact that the part of the fruits of technical prog-
ress which was not transferred to the labour 
force was not reflected in a fall in prices. This 
same fact likewise explains the division of the 
system into centres and periphery. 
However these fruits were distributed in-
ternally in the centres during those earlier days 
of capitalism, the growth of global demand has 
concentrated in them, along with the investment 
necessary to meet it. And therein also lay the 
source of the succession of technical innovations 
which characterized the system. 
This , then, is another important conse-
quence of the phenomenon of the surplus. The 
concept of periphery could hardly find a place in 
the conventional theories that have omitted this 
phenomenon. 
This is why the primary-producer countries 
remained on the sidelines of industrialization. 
T h e centres had no interest in investing in them, 
except in the development of exportable primary 
production and its allied activities. 
Why did they not invest, in view of the advan-
tage of cheap labour in the periphery? The 
economic fragmentation of the latter has had its 
effect on this. In my view, however, the di-
versification of demand which is developing in 
the centres has been the major factor. We have 
explained this phenomenon and it calls for fur-
ther emphasis. As technical progress increases the 
quantity of goods and raises income, particularly 
in the more privileged social groups, a large part 
of demand is not directed to these same goods 
owing to a trend towards saturation, but rather to 
new forms of goods or different goods resulting 
from other technological innovations which be-
come more and more important in the course of 
development. And the capital accumulation de-
riving from the surplus, as well as the labour 
force, follows the impetus of this dynamic. Thus 
the logic of the system itself was giving the cen-
tres a dominant role. 
As the periphery was left on the fringe of 
technical progress, it could not participate in this 
diversification of production. The diversified 
goods came to it in accordance with the dominant 
precept of the international division of labour, 
i.e., in exchange for primary exports. 
It was a case of appendicular development. 
Thus there was no global expansion of capitalism 
but only a partial and asymmetrical growth. That 
alluring image of worldwide capitalist expansion 
and its progressive social penetration did not 
materialize. And industrialization did not come 
spontaneously but at the decision of the periph-
ery itself, taken especially from the time of the 
great world depression of the 1930s, in order to 
combat the adverse consequences of the crisis. 
This new stage was increasingly inspired by im-
itation of the ways of life in the centres and of 
their institutions. 
Appendicular development has since then 
been giving way to what we might call the dawn of 
the integral development of the periphery. 
Meanwhile, the centres were reinforcing their 
economic and technological superiority. So the 
periphery had to resort to protection in order to 
industrialize. It was a protection improvised and 
abusive of the main but, all in all, it enabled the 
periphery to grow more rapidly than at the 
generally slow rate of its primary exports. 
In the adverse conditions, first of the Great 
Depression and later of the Second World War, 
there could be no thought of exporting man-
ufactures to the centres: industrialization had 
necessarily to be based on import substitution for 
the domestic market. This was followed by some 
degree of inertia until the spectacular rates of 
development of the centres up to the middle of 
the 1970s, and incentive measures in some pe-
ripheral countries, gave a start to the export of 
manufactures. 
Thus, little by little, the passivity which had 
characterized the periphery in the capitalism of 
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the past began to disappear. But in the centres, 
even in their long years of prosperity, there was 
no general policy favourable to this new form of 
international division of labour which differed 
from the earlier schemes. There was no clear-cut 
response to the periphery's insistent pleas for 
better treatment for its exports of manufactures. 
The periphery was in fact excluded, save in 
minor respects, from the great liberalizing move-
ment which occurred at that time among the 
centres. 
Despite the substantial changes which are 
thus taking place, concepts wholly correspond-
ing to appendicular development linger on in the 
centres. Some years ago it seemed as though for-
mer ways of thinking would undergo a degree of 
modification, but now we are witnessing certain 
regressive manifestations, especially in the Uni-
ted States, where we have recently seen a vig-
orous resurgence of economic liberalism. 
In those early days, prompted by their own 
convenience, the centres were not anxious for 
capitalism to penetrate the periphery beyond its 
appendicular role. This also suited the interests of 
the dominant groups in the periphery. There 
was, indeed, a coincidence of interests; and great 
masses of the population, especially in the rural 
areas, were relegated to a position of exclusion 
from development. 
According to these concepts formulated in 
the centres, the periphery should be unre-
servedly open to the international economy, 
and this called for strict observance of the princi-
ples of the international division of labour, with-
out artificial measures hampering the opera-
tion of economic laws; and it should likewise be 
unconditionally open to foreign capital. 
While these principles of the international 
division of labour increasingly strengthened the 
economic linkage among the centres, the periph-
ery remained economically fragmented outside 
this unifying process. This fragmentation, the 
openness to trade and finance, and the growing 
economic and technological superiority of the 
centres, were strong pillars supporting the hege-
mony of the centres, particularly that of the lead-
ing dynamic centre of the time. 
These remarks are not prompted by a mere 
urge to probe into the past which would be 
irrelevant to the purpose of these pages. That is 
not so; the fact is that these concepts of appen-
dicular development represent in my view the 
background of certain attitudes well-known at 
the present time. In these days of headlong ad-
vance in service techniques we are recommended 
to open up to them, and also to imports of goods 
in which these technical advances are displayed. 
There is a renewed attack on import substitution. 
And at the same time emphasis is laid on the 
advantages for our development of free foreign 
investment through the efficient channel of the 
transnational corporations. 
We have repeatedly maintained in ECLAC 
that import substitution is not a doctrinaire pref-
erence but a response to the consequences of the 
time-lag in industrialization and to the above-
mentioned economic and technological su-
periority of the centres. 
2. Innovations diversifying goods and services 
It is impossible to understand the exclusion of 
the periphery from the liberalizing movement in 
process in the centres without taking into account 
the technological innovations which give great 
impetus to diversification. Liberalization was in 
the last analysis the result of these innovations 
carried out in the main by the transnational 
corporations and of the dominant role they play 
in the trade of the centres. 
The increase in productivity and in the sur-
plus enabled them to shift capital and labour 
from the activities where the growth of demand 
was relatively slow to those benefiting by the in-
novations in question. 
Trade was stimulated by shifts in demand 
rather than by a fall in prices. Prices fall mainly in 
the case of goods for which demand is weakened 
by shifts to new forms or new goods: it is a re-
sidual decline. 
Demand for diversified goods also tends to 
accelerate in the ever more imitative capitalism of 
the periphery. But in contrast with this, produc-
tion of these goods, owing to the time-lag in in-
dustrialization, is continually overtaken by the 
growth of demand. So this latter has to be satis-
fied by imports, whose rate of growth exceeds 
that of primary exports, save in exceptional 
cases. 
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3. The trend towards external disequilibrium 
Thus to the trend towards internal dynamic dis-
equilibrium is added that of external dynamic 
disequilibrium. The periphery attempts to cor-
rect it by the export of manufactures. But the 
centres are reluctant to accept them freely. 
In fact, a new phenomenon is emerging on 
the international plane, since peripheral com-
petition, contrary to what is happening internally 
in the centres, is characterized not so much by 
diversification of goods as by the fall in their 
prices, since they are precisely those goods for 
which demand tends to grow relatively slowly in 
the centres; and this gives rise to the aforesaid 
new unprecedented phenomenon, namely, the 
incipient external vulnerability of the surplus in 
the centres. Although the unemployment arising 
from peripheral competition is not excessive, it is 
added to that s temming from the internal 
dynamic disequilibrium, and the centres defend 
themselves with measures restricting imports, 
thus warding off a fall in prices adverse to the 
growth of the surplus. 
Consider what all this means. The internal 
dynamic disequilibrium, as we have tried to show 
above, leads inevitably to a new type of inflation ; 
and the monetary authority has no other instru-
ment available for combating it than credit 
restriction. We already know that the results of 
this are counterproductive in that they cause a 
considerable waste of productive resources. All in 
all, the monetary instrument is very far from 
correcting the factors responsible for structural 
disequilibrium. At the same time, the restrictions 
which hamper the imports of the periphery 
mean that the reciprocal advantages of trading 
industrial goods which are technologically simple 
for others produced with spearhead technology 
are lost, to the detriment of the rate of develop-
ment of centres and periphery. 
This is what was thought some time ago when 
the transnational corporations thrust their ways 
into the industrialization of the periphery. Dur-
ing those long years of prosperity in the centres, 
it was assumed that the transnationals would play 
a very important part in the internationalization 
of production, through the development of new 
patterns of industrial trade, thanks to which the 
periphery would be able to counteract its ex-
ternal disequilibrium. But this has not happened, 
since although the transnational enterprises play 
a major role in peripheral industrialization and 
in the reciprocal trade of peripheral countries, it 
is no less true that through the very nature of 
their technological innovations concentrated in 
the centres, they do not contribute substantially 
to the penetration of peripheral imports into the 
said centres. 
4. The external vulnerability of the surplus 
The external vulnerability of the surplus of the 
centres is not something that can be analysed 
outside the context of their global development. 
We have seen how a shift of demand is brought 
about by the diversifying innovations of technol-
ogy. The diversification of demand could not 
take place without the growth of income arising 
from the growth of productivity and the forma-
tion of the surplus, which is the main source of 
capital accumulation to meet these changes in 
demand. The more intensive this dynamic phe-
nomenon, the greater are the possibilities of dis-
placement of the surplus of those industries where 
the growth of demand is relatively slow. 
Now, the vulnerability of the surplus is 
occurring in the centres because of their internal 
dynamic disequilibrium and is also beginning to 
occur through peripheral competition. This 
makes an upward shift more difficult and leads 
to the restriction of imports of peripheral origin. 
This does not mean that if the rate of de-
velopment of the centres were high external vul-
nerability would be unimportant. I am inclined 
to believe that this is not the case. In the boom 
years, when important centres satisfied part of 
their high demand for labour through foreign 
immigration, they still refrained from liberal-
izing their imports of manufactures. 
It is not only a question of political pressures 
opposed to liberalization. Consider for a moment 
that the dynamics of the system is basically sus-
tained by the growth of the surplus. Fun-
damentally, defence of the surplus runs counter 
to liberalization, and avails itself, as we already 
know, of all sorts of restrictive measures. 
It might be argued, however, that cases also 
occur of internal competition. Internally the 
reduc t ion of the surplus in the industries 
affected is offset by its increase in those compet-
ing successfully. The global surplus still main-
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tains its capacity for accumulation within a single 
country. On the other hand, in the case of ex-
ternal competition, the increase in the surplus 
occurs in the periphery while its decline takes 
place in the centres. 
The concept implicit in the conventional 
arguments, according to which technical prog-
ress results in a fall in prices and accumulation 
depends on the movement of interest rates, hind-
ers the elucidation of these phenomena. Its is 
often said in the centres that the activities 
affected by peripheral competition must defend 
themselves by technical innovations which reduce 
their costs. Quite right. But it must be considered 
whether these activities are going to continue 
producing the same goods or whether they in-
tend to employ their surplus in diversification. So 
this is a different case from that of peripheral 
competition. 
5. The agricultural surplus and its vulnerability 
This last consideration leads me to deal with the 
very important problem created by technical in-
novations in agriculture. There the possibilities oí 
diversification of goods are extremely limited, 
particularly when the innovations are extended 
in one form or another to the whole sphere of 
production. Land cannot be shifted like capital to 
the production of diversified goods. Hence inno-
vations which increase the volume of production 
beyond the absorption capacity of demand bring 
with them a fall in prices owing to the relatively 
low elasticity which characterizes these goods. 
The fruits of technical progress thus tend to be 
transferred to the consumers, often leaving the 
agricultural producers in a precarious situation. 
This fact explains the interventionist mea-
sures of the State in major countries. Hence in 
the United States there have been attempts for a 
long time past to curb the fall in agricultural 
1. The image of general equilibrium 
Recognition of the great importance of enter-
prices through various measures restricting pro-
duction of exportable goods or imports of goods 
subject to external competition. Much the same 
thing happens in the European Economic Com-
munity. And when the safeguards are not suf-
ficient, recourse is had to dumping excess sup-
plies at any price on the international market. 
This happens even in periods in which the 
excellence of market laws is being preached, es-
pecially when the periphery advocates the de-
sirability of agreements on primary products to 
correct or mitigate the deterioration in the terms 
of trade. 
I always remember, because of its intrinsic 
significance, the recommendation made to us by 
one of the most eminent experts of the United 
States when we began to maintain in ECLAC that 
industrialization was an inevitable requisite of 
development. If you want to develop, he told us, 
do your utmost to introduce technical advances 
into primary production. But how can we employ 
the redundant labour force which the increase in 
productivity brings with it? How can we prevent, 
or at least minimize, the deterioration aforesaid? 
Industrial protection —moderate, of course— 
would have the virtue of shifting agricultural 
investment into industry and other activities 
to achieve this objective. 
In reality, it was a question of different in-
terests. What interested and continues to interest 
the centres is a fall in the prices of the primary 
products they import. This assertion might seem 
to contradict what we have said in this same sec-
tion about peripheral competition. The con-
tradiction is only apparent, since a fall in the 
prices of primary products enlarges the surplus 
of the centres while a fall in the price of man-
ufactures diminishes it. 
This leads me to insist, at the risk of tedium, 
on the importance of including the surplus as 
one of the key factors in the internal and in-
ternational sphere. 
preneurial initiative in the market and of econom-
ic incentive to stimulate it, as well as of the role of 
this incentive in the efficiency of the labour force, 
IV 
Theories and reality of development 
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is helping to exalt the significance of the neoclas-
sical theories. I fully share this recognition 
(which socialism in practice can no longer escape) 
but I am very far from considering that the mar-
ket and the laws of its operation constitute the 
supreme regulator of the economy. 
The neoclassical theories argue thus: if left to 
themselves, without disturbing interventions, the 
market forces make for general equilibrium in 
the economic system. This conception of equilib-
rium and the mathematical rigour of its de-
monstration is the most seductive feature of 
these theories. 
It has cost me an effort to discard them after 
having convinced myself, through observation of 
real phenomena, that the evolution of the system 
inevitably leads to disequilibrium: to internal 
dynamic disequilibrium, both in the centres and 
in the periphery, and to disequilibrium in the 
relations between the two. 
This never was —and still is not— the view of 
the neoclassical theorists, because they circum-
scribe the market to the positive elements men-
tioned above and to the significance of the price 
system. But they overlook, in contrast, the action 
of other factors responsible for such dis-
equilibria, which remove the market farther and 
farther from the neoclassical model. 
2. The most significant differences 
I devote this sub-section to analysing the divorce 
between the aforesaid theories and reality, be-
ginning by presenting the main differences be-
tween neoclassical thinking and the real 
functioning of the system which I have tried to 
interpret in the foregoing pages. 
According to neoclassical arguments, the 
fruits of technical progress are distributed social-
ly by virtue of the interplay of competition. I 
contend that a large part of these fruits is re-
tained in the hands of the owners of the means of 
production in the form of surplus. The surplus is 
sustained, therefore, by social inequality. 
The surplus has a great dynamic role, since it 
is the primordial source of the reproductive 
capital accumulation which multiplies employ-
ment, productivity and income. The complete 
fulfilment of this role calls, on the one hand, for a 
passive labour force and a laissez-faire State, and, 
on the other, requires that a high proportion of 
the surplus be dedicated to accumulation instead 
of to consumption. This has been the capitalism 
of the past, at least in respect of the growth of the 
surplus. 
The free play of market laws and the ever-
increasing trend towards the diversification of 
goods and services do not ensure the fulfilment 
of these conditions. 
In fact, in the course of the evolution of the 
system the labour force and the State are eager to 
share in the fruits of technical progress to the 
detriment of the growth of the surplus and re-
productive accumulation. This hampers the 
fulfilment of the dynamic role of the surplus, and 
the crisis of the system supervenes. The crisis is 
the dénouement of contemporary capitalism. 
This crisis is outside the scope of the neoclas-
sical theories, which say nothing of the social 
structure and its mutations. They also omit from 
their arguments the contradictions of technolo-
gy: the ecological deterioration and the popula-
tion growth resulting from scientific and tech-
nological progress. For the neoclassicists all these 
are exogenous phenomena which need not sully 
the doctrinal purity of their lucubrations. It is a 
fact that Malthus pointed out at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century the potential conflict be-
tween the growth rate of the population and the 
limited resources of the system. But this phe-
nomenon also was left out of the theories of 
general equilibrium constructed by the neoclassi-
cists decades later. They recognize now, howev-
er, the necessity of regulating population growth 
—but not the need to regulate the system! 
From another standpoint, the neoclassical 
theories assume the spontaneous expansion of 
capitalism throughout the world. But this is con-
trary to fact. The primary-producer countries 
were left on the sidelines of industrialization in 
the earlier days of capitalism. Their development 
was essentially appendicular to that of the cen-
tres. 
According to the theories in question, in-
dustrialization must be spontaneous and not 
achieved artificially by means of protection. But 
the crises in the centres forced the periphery to 
deviate from market laws and to seek in-
dustrialization. In this way their integral de-
velopment began to evolve. 
Thanks to its deliberate industrialization the 
periphery has with the passage of time become 
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competitive in a wide range of goods. But the 
centres object to accepting market laws on the 
international plane and diverge from them by 
applying all kinds of restrictions to imports from 
the periphery. They preached comparative 
advantages when the periphery had no indus-
tries. And now that it has them they ignore 
them. 
When all is said and done, the evolution of 
the system, through structural change and the 
contradictions of technology, is far from condu-
cing the best utilization of productive resources, 
as the neoclassical theories maintain. 
Incidentally, the neoclassical economists also 
overlook the time factor in the production pro-
cess and therefore do not grasp the important 
phenomenon of retention of the structural sur-
plus. 
They assumed implicitly that "supply creates 
its own demand", that is, that the creation of 
income coincides with the production of the 
corresponding goods. They did not perceive that 
demand comes from the income generated in 
the process of production of future goods and 
not in that of the current supply, this being a fact 
of major importance. 
3. The free play of market laws 
Their remoteness from reality definitively 
accounts for the impotence of the neoclassical 
theories in face of the system's trends towards 
disequilibrium. To tackle internal disequilibrium 
they resort to monetary restriction which, besides 
involving a great waste of productive resources, 
does not remoVe the basic factors which provoke 
it and exposes the system to its reappearance. 
And as regards external disequilibrium, when 
the periphery attempts to correct it by adding its 
exports of manufactures to primary products, 
the centres have recourse to all kinds of pro-
tectionist measures to prevent external vul-
nerability of the surplus, at the cost of the com-
parative advantages of trade. 
It is really paradoxical that, despite the di-
vorce between theory and reality, they continue 
preaching the virtues of the free play of the mar-
ket, and contending that market laws lead to a 
better allocation of productive resources. Better 
for whom? If the reference is to the social groups 
structurally favoured in the distribution of the 
fruits of technical progress, the allocation would 
be correct. But in the case of the less privileged 
groups and the lower strata relegated to the bot-
tom of the social structure, it is very far from 
being so. 
Again, if it is a question of the centres, the 
allocation ofresources would be correct for them 
from the global standpoint. But if we consider 
the periphery, which the free play of market laws 
had left on the sidelines of industrialization: 
could it be said that the free play of the market 
would bring with it the best allocation of re-
sources from the international point of view? 
This problem of exclusion had no chance of 
being resolved without the deliberate in-
dustrialization of the periphery. 
The centres opposed the protection through 
which the periphery gave decisive impetus to the 
industrializing process. They maintained that in 
the play of market forces the correct solution was 
to reduce wages in order to offset the economic 
and technological superiority of the centres. 
And with this in view they preached mone-
tary devaluation. Devaluation would bring down 
the prices of the primary products which were 
now competitive. This solution was unacceptable 
to the periphery since in that way it would trans-
fer to the exterior at least a part of the fruits of 
technical progress; but it was highly desirable for 
the centres, since a fall in commodity prices 
would expand their surplus. 
From its earliest days ECLAC set itself to clarify 
these problems and affirmed the economic jus-
tifiability of protection within certain limits, al-
ways provided that its global cost was lower than 
the loss of export earnings. Within these limits, 
protection would make it possible to raise the 
rate of internal development. 
In this matter there is a basic problem for the 
centres too. The periphery has only just begun to 
export manufactures, thanks to the incorpora-
tion of technologies from the centres and to low-
er wages. And as it makes headway in its in-
dustrialization, its exports will be able to enter 
progressively upon increasingly advanced lines 
of technology. Thus the centres are confronted 
with a serious dilemma. If they continue to im-
pose unilateral restrictive measures, they lose or 
curtail the comparative advantages of trade. And 
if they reduce wages, taking indirect advantage 
of devaluation, this will obviously result in the 
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transfer to the exterior of part of the productivity 
of their own export activities. 
This would not be a sporadic occurrence, but 
touches the very dynamics of the system which 
demands the persistent growth of the surplus. 
The impotence of the neoclassical theories in 
face of the system's external and internal dis-
equilibrium leads them to stray from their own 
principles, however much they may continue to 
affirm that market laws conduce to an optimum 
allocation of productive resources. But these 
disequilibria are not the only cases. 
In the previous section I mentioned the prob-
lem that technical progress poses in agriculture. 
Whereas in manufactured goods diversification 
defeats the trend towards saturation of demand, 
agriculture's scant possibilities of doing so expose 
it to the transfer, internally or externally, of the 
fruits of its technical progress. A problem which, 
like those mentioned above, is far from having 
reached a rational solution. 
4 The development ethic 
If the neoclassical theories have not faced up to 
the distribution struggle which evolves in the 
course of development it is because they harbour 
a latent ethic when they sustain that in general 
equilibrium of the system the remunerations of 
the factors are determined in consonance with 
their contribution to the productive process. The 
argument is perfectly logical, but far removed 
from reality owing to the contradictions of tech-
nology and the changing structure of society. 
Hence the great flaws in these arguments 
which cannot be put right by mathematical sub-
tleties. 
Here we come to the nub of the problem. It is 
clear that if the fruits of technical progress were 
distributed as the neoclassicists maintain, there 
would be no justification whatsoever for trade-
union and political action of a redistributive 
kind. But this is not the case, as a large part of the 
fruits of technical progress are seized and re-
tained by the social groups favoured under the 
system, both through the power of appropriation 
of the surplus and through the social power of 
the privileged groups. 
This provokes the aforesaid action to obtain 
a part of these fruits. In view of the nature of the 
system, the labour force cannot raise its own pri-
vate and social spending at the expense of the 
consumption of the privileged social groups; its 
expenditure is added to that of the latter and also 
to the expenditure of the State, all this to the 
detriment of the growth rate of the surplus and 
therefore of reproductive investment. To re-
establish the dynamics of the system unemploy-
ment is created by means of the monetary instru-
ment. 
In this way the burden of adjustment falls on 
the labour force. Of course, as the dynamics of 
the system is based on social inequality, if an 
attempt is made to correct this inequality beyond 
certain limits the system reacts with inflation. 
The monetary instrument to combat it imposes a 
regression on the labour force, not only in re-
spect of the progress made in its own private and 
social consumpt ion beyond the limits de-
termined by market laws, but also in order to 
cope with the expenses of the State in so far as it 
cannot reduce them; and, in addition, to satisfy 
the consumption of the privileged social groups. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century 
the rigour of the neoclassical theories and their 
concept of general equilibrium claimed to give a 
scientific response to the Marxist theory of sur-
plus value; they alleged, in effect, that the Ricar-
dian theory of value adopted by Marx had no 
scientific meaning. And even if it had, they tried 
to show that the interplay of competition would 
dissolve the surplus value socially, just like the 
economic surplus, as has been mentioned else-
where. 
If the structural nature of the surplus were 
ignored, together with the contradictions of tech-
nique and the changes in the social structure (i.e., 
an impor tan t facet of reality), the Marxist 
theory could be impugned with solid arguments. 
The neoclassicists, at the time, believed that they 
h a d d e s t r o y e d it, w i thou t envisaging its 
enormous political significance; just as nowadays 
they do not grasp the nature of the surplus and 
its decisive role in capitalist development. 
The concept of surplus value refuted the 
e t h i c u n d e r l y i n g neoc lass ica l t h i n k i n g . 
Nevertheless, the theoretical reasoning on which 
this ethic is based went so far as to argue that the 
surplus value arbitrarily deprived the workers of 
a portion of the social product which was theirs 
by right. The same could be said of the economic 
surplus, i.e., that the owners of the means of 
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production take what is not their due. Strictly 
speaking, the surplus represents an important 
part of the fruits of technical progress, which in 
its turn derives from scientific advances. If we 
had to assign them by right, going back through 
time to the long series of scientists and tech-
nological innovators, we should be confronted 
with a problem impossible to solve scientifically. 
There is no scientific solution. The solution 
is basically ethical: the surplus belongs to society 
as a whole and must be used in accordance with 
ethical principles. 
It is essential that this distribution, guided by 
ethical principles, should be dynamic and not 
statically frittered away. Thus, for technical prog-
ress to penetrate ever more deeply into the 
structure of society, extending its fruits to the 
whole community, a sufficient part of these fruits 
must be devoted to the accumulation of repro-
ductive capital. Hence equitable distribution and 
accumulation form an integral part of the ethic 
of development. And to comply with it there is a 
need for rationality, that is, a rationality linked to 
the attainment of ethical objectives. 
5. The macroeconomic regulation of the surplus 
These ethical objectives could not be achieved 
through the play of market forces but only by the 
regulation of the surplus and its social use. 
In what does this regulation consist? We 
must start from this initial concept: the market is 
not effective in determining the global part of the 
surplus which has to be devoted to expenditure 
and reproductive accumulation. We have 
already explained elsewhere how the private and 
social expenditure of the labour force and the 
civil and military expenditure of the State are 
superimposed on the expenditure of the priv-
ileged social groups; and we have likewise 
argued that there are no spontaneous mecha-
nisms within the market which will ensure the 
compatibility of these different expenditures 
with one another and as a whole, or the volume to 
be devoted to reproductive accumulation. These 
compartments of expenditure could be justified 
as separate items, but not as a whole, if the rate of 
the necessary accumulation is taken into account. 
A rate of expenditures which debilitates that 
of accumulation inevitably compels their reduc-
tion to a lower level than would have been the 
case if they had grown spontaneously. But the 
reduction does not equitably affect all the social 
groups but falls on the weakest parts of the 
system. 
It is essential for the two elements to be mac-
roeconomically regulated if they are to be dynam-
ically compatible. This is a primordial requisite 
of development. 
6. The social efficacy of capitalism 
This tendency to dynamic disequilibrium did not 
occur in those early days of capitalism to which 
we have referred elsewhere. Does this mean that 
the above-mentioned theories were at that time 
consonant with the reality of capitalist develop-
ment? This would be a serious theoretical error. 
Certainly there had been no crisis like that of the 
present time, apart from the cyclical crises. I say 
this because in those days, just as now, one of the 
basic assumptions of the theory had not been 
fulfilled, namely, social dissemination through a 
fall in prices correlative to the increase in pro-
ductivity, inasmuch as it was not transferred to 
the labour force: it remained in the form of sur-
plus. But even in those times the market could 
not ensure per se the social efficacy of capitalism 
throughout the whole context of the system, i.e., 
a deeper and deeper penetration of technique 
into the structure of society thanks to the 
accumulation of the surplus. This depended fun-
damentally on the degree of austerity of the sys-
tem, that is, upon an essentially cultural phe-
nomenon. 
It is conceivable, however, that in an austere 
form of capitalism too a crisis of accumulation 
could supervene, even given a passive labour 
force and a laissez-faire State, or, in other words, 
even if the essential conditions of the neoclassical 
paradigm were present. The crisis would result 
from progressive euthanasia of the surplus. 
In fact, the higher the rate of accumulation, 
the more intensive would be the shift of labour 
from lower to higher technical levels. And as the 
proportion of the former gradually declined and 
the heterogeneity of the structure was thus pro-
gressively cor rec ted , there would be a 
spontaneous increase in the capacity of the 
labour force to raise its pay in correlation with the 
increment in productivity through the play of 
market forces itself, even in the absence of redis-
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tributive power. And as the surplus is the part of 
this productivity which is not transferred to the 
labour force, the paradoxical outcome would be 
a weakening of the rate of accumulation itself 
and transformation of the process would once 
again become indispensable. 
If I digress for a moment from this hypoth-
esis it is in order to reinforce a conclusion to 
which I attach great importance. I have repeat-
edly said that the dynamics of the system is based 
on the surplus, which is a clear expression of 
social inequity in the distribution of the fruits of 
technical progress. In the course of democratiza-
tion, the trade-union and political power of the 
labour force endeavours to mitigate this inequity 
and thereby helps to make the surplus vulner-
able, as does also the evolution of the State. The 
results of these phenomena lead to the crisis of 
accumulation. And I have just noted likewise 
that, with the passage of time, the austerity of the 
system could also culminate in a crisis of the 
accumulation process, if we were to carry theore-
tical reasoning to an extreme by ignoring structu-
ral change and the contradictions of technology. 
What does this theoretical conclusion sig-
nify? It signifies that the dynamics of the system 
based on the surplus constitutes a historical 
category in capitalist development and this catego-
ry in one way or another ends in crisis. It is a 
his tor ical ca tegory tha t has not been sur-
mounted. 
The system has no spontaneous formulas for 
resolving this crisis. The crisis has to be resolved 
through the rational transformation of the pro-
cess of accumulation and income distribution. It 
is imperative, then, to enter upon a new historical 
category if the system is to preserve and increase 
its capacity for human welfare, both in the cen-
tres and above all in peripheral capitalism. 
7. Theories and interests 
I have contended on more than one occasion that 
the persistence of the neoclassical theories was 
due not only to their rigorous logic but also to their 
conformity with interests of great political 
weight. 
In the earlier days of capitalism the existence 
and enlargement of the surplus was a desirable 
thing for the social groups. It was for the play of 
market forces —the law of supply and demand— 
to determine wages; and for the State to take a 
laissez-faire line regarding income distribution. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
neoclassical theories had ignored the structural 
phenomenon of the surplus under the influence 
of the dominant interests. It naturally suited 
those interests that there should never be any 
counterweight to the appropriation by the high-
er strata of a large part of the fruits of technical 
progress. 
It is not surprising that, with the progressive 
evolution of the trade-union and political power 
of the labour force and with the proportionate 
rise in State expendi ture , the neoclassicists 
should have criticized these developments as 
constituting a violation of market laws. 
Neither is it surprising, in the light of this 
interpretation, that the neoclassicists advocate a 
monetarist policy to counter the inflationary cri-
sis of the system, since this ultimately means the 
curbing of the trade-union power of the labour 
force to the extent of forcing it to accept lower 
wages in face of the resulting unemployment. 
This is why even governments in favour of social 
equity find themselves forced to pursue such a 
policy in order to correct the dynamic dis-
equilibrium, since in view of the nature of the 
system they have no other ways of regulation at 
their disposal. 
Thus is shattered the illusory belief that in 
the course of democratization the power of the 
dominant groups will ultimately be counter-
acted. Illusory, because sooner or later the need 
to give impetus to the dynamics of the system 
induces such governments to reestablish the sur-
plus, making the cost fall on the labour force, 
albeit unevenly. In the end, thanks to the mone-
tary instrument, the power of the privileged strata 
prevails. 
In the same way the crisis of the system leads 
the State to halt or curtail its social expenditure, 
generally in advance of other expenditure, in-
cluding that of a military nature, in order to 
reduce or eliminate the fiscal deficit which is 
frequently an expression of the dynamic dis-
equilibrium of the system. 
It is obvious that this is an attempt to restore 
the passivity of the labour force and the dis-
tributive unconcern of the State, without regard 
to the fact that this is not an arbitrary phe-
nomenon but the result of the appropriation of a 
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large part of the fruits of technical progress by 
the upper strata. 
If considerations of equity prevailed, the 
labour force would have to participate more and 
more in the fruits of technical progress and in the 
process of accumulation. This must inevitably be 
achieved at the expense not only of the consump-
tion of the privileged social groups but also of the 
consumption aspirations of a part of the labour 
force, in order to raise capital accumulation and 
productivity, especially in those strata relegated 
to the bottom of the social structure. 
Herein lies the fundamental problem which 
has to be tackled in capitalism by the political art 
of development; despite its vigour, the crisis of 
the system is leading to a marked frustration, 
involving a regression in wages and social ser-
vices to a level lower than would have been 
attained if a regular rate of growth had been 
achieved. 
A transformation of the process is required: 
a very difficult task which requires first of all a 
theoretical elucidation. Instead of the distribu-
tion struggle which ends in dynamic disequi-
librium and inflation, a social consensus will have 
to be reached under the aegis of the State. 
Experience will show whether we shall have 
to pass through successive upheavals before 
achieving that social consensus which, inspired 
by equity, will rationally restore the dynamics of 
the system; and which will also attain this objec-
tive in full compatibility with the spontaneous 
evolution of entrepreneurial initiative in the 
market. This last does not imply to overlooking 
the serious defects of the market, which are 
usually euphemistical ly re fer red to as im-
perfections. We have come a long way from 
Adam Smith's vision of thousands and thousands 
of enterprises in full competition. It would have 
been difficult if not impossible in those days to 
imagine the phenomenon of concentration 
which stems not only from the demands of tech-
nology but also from the process of accumulation 
itself. 
Likewise in line with the dominant interests 
of the centres were the theories of trade and the 
international division of labour, which historical-
ly so greatly delayed peripheral industrialization. 
There was in fact a concordance of interests 
between the exporters ofmanufactures from the 
centres and the primary exporters of the periph-
ery, always opposed to a protection which in-
creased the cost of their imports of consumer and 
capital goods. 
This earlier concept of the international divi-
sion of labour left great masses of the periphery 
on the sidelines of development. Sooner or later 
the pressure of these masses and also of certain 
leader groups would have brought about in-
dustrialization; the crisis in the centres was to be 
responsible for speeding it up. The fact that pro-
tection has been abusive and arbitrary is another 
matter. 
Similarly, the weight of interest of activities 
adversely affected by, the industrial and agri-
cultural imports of the centres is reflected in 
restrictive or prohibitive measures against pe-
ripheral competition, without any consensus 
having been reached to ensure enjoyment of the 
reciprocal advantages of trade. 
8. A global theory of development 
The effort to interpret this crisis of capitalism in 
the light of conventional theories leads to great 
frustrations both in thinking and in action. It 
calls for the formulation of a global theory of 
development which will integrate both centres 
and periphery, since they are part of a single 
system. 
The view has sometimes been taken that, 
after devoting ourselves to analysing the pe-
ripheral phenomena which evolved within our 
own field of vision, we conceived the odd notion 
of developing a peripheral theory different from 
the theories elaborated in the centres. These lat-
ter suffered, in our view, from a false sense of 
universality, which gave rise to conclusions as to 
the praxis of our development which reality proved 
to be unacceptable. It must be remembered, 
however, that neither the theories nor the con-
clusions had got to the bottom of the vital process 
of accumulation and its structural significance. 
Undoubtedly an analysis of this phenomenon 
could help us in formulating a global theory of 
development. 
This global theory must go beyond purely 
economic aspects. It will have been noted that I 
do not speak of the economic system but simply 
of the system. For the system of capitalism 
integrates diverse elements which could not be 
omitted from a global theory. We have already 
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mentioned that the social structure is subject to 
continuous mutations which go hand in hand 
with the penetration of technology and that this 
latter presents increasing contradictions. A glob-
al theory could hardly be confined within the 
arbitrary framework of an economic theory 
when reality embraces at one and the same time 
technical, economic, social, cultural and political 
elements all interlinked by relations of mutual 
dependence. In the course of the mutations of 
1. Inflation in the periphery 
and its political significance 
Never until now had the Latin American periph-
ery experienced such a combination of factors 
prejudicial to its development . The conse-
quences of an over-protracted international cri-
sis aggravate and complicate the internal crisis of 
our countries. 
All of them, in varying degree, are hard beset 
by inflation. And this is certainly not a merely 
monetary phenomenon, as we have tried to bring 
out in the present pages. It derives from factors 
operating deep in the heart of society and tearing 
it apart. It is there that the structural conse-
quences of the evolution of technology and its 
contradictions combine to take effect. 
The laissez-faire State and the passive labour 
force are things of the past. Laissez-faire as re-
gards income redistribution, but not with respect 
to the original distribution of the fruits of tech-
nical progress, inasmuch as the State depended 
on a political power which rested on the social 
groups benefiting by the appropriation of those 
fruits, mainly in the form of economic surplus. 
Today these groups are confronted by oth-
ers whose growing power is fostered by the de-
mocratization process. These groups appeared 
to be carrying more and more weight in the 
struggle for redistribution. But this development 
caused a gradual erosion of the political power 
on which the State is based, since the said groups, 
in the course of a redistribution struggle, tend to 
the social structure there are also changes in pow-
er relations, which intervene both in the initial 
appropriation of the fruits of technical progress 
and in their subsequent redistribution. That the 
play of these relat ions ex tends to the in-
ternational field is implicit in our reference to the 
hegemony of the centres over the periphery, es-
pecially that of the leading dynamic centre of 
capitalism. We shall deal with this in the next 
section. 
override the State. The State is not showing abil-
ity to dominate them and channel distribution 
and the capital accumulation process. 
Faced with the impotence of the State and 
the erosion of political power, the system inevi-
tably develops a trend towards exacerbation of 
the inflation spiral. And the attempts to contain it 
are short-lived as well as being counterproduc-
tive. For the only instrument remaining to the 
State is anachronistic, depressive and regressive: 
i.e., the monetary instrument. 
What is happening to the State is really para-
doxical. It is tending towards hypertrophy, with 
manifold responsibilities militating against its 
own efficacy; and with a proliferation of in-
terventions which undermine the economic free-
dom of enterprises and individuals and in-
creasingly incapacitate the State itself from 
fulfilling the role of supreme regulator that the 
market fails to perform. 
The solution of this grave problem is not to 
be sought only in institutional changes which will 
promote the correct functioning of the democrat-
ic process and the restoration of that political 
power on which the State must be based. This is 
important, but it is not all. There is also an in-
escapable need to transform with a strong sense 
of social equity, the processes of appropriation of 
the fruits of technical progress, of their distribu-
tion and of the capital accumulation which will 
give vigorous impetus to economic development. 
It will not be possible to suppress the growing 
diversity of interests which the changes in the 
V 
Concluding remarks 
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social structure bring in their train. But it is im-
perative to introduce concord and discipline into 
the distribution struggle through a social con-
sensus which will restore the political power of 
the State and bestow on it the aforesaid regulat-
ing function. 
T h e time has come for a great synthesis be-
tween this regulating function of the State and 
the play of market forces, in which the economic 
freedom of enterprises and consumers can be 
exercised with a minimum of obstruction. 
A very arduous, intricate and complicated 
task. It must be preceded by a major effort of 
enlightenment and persuasion, by a dialogue 
free of dogmatic preconceptions. But this re-
quires time and purposeful perseverance. 
In the meantime there are immediate solu-
tions to be undertaken. That social consensus 
which must come sooner or later should be ini-
tiated without delay through an income policy 
which, while guiding the system on the road to 
equity, encourages the participation (and also the 
responsibility), of the labour force in the task of 
reproductive accumulation. This calls for the 
prior recovery of the surplus, especially where it 
has suffered severely from inflation. There will 
have to be fiscal discipline combined with wage 
restraint in order to achieve the said recovery of 
the surplus with a view to promoting reproduc-
tive accumulation. 
And here there arises the need for a decision 
of great economic and social importance. Will 
accumulation remain solely in the hands of the 
hitherto advantaged social groups, or will it also 
be progressively shared by the broad social strata, 
which are compelled —at least momentarily— to 
rein in their aspirations? 
It is common knowledge that some time ago 
IMF unilaterally established a régime of con-
ditionality which is disquieting to all of us and 
which is apt to be inspired by dogmatic principles 
which are not in keeping with the requirements 
of peripheral development. At one time or an-
other the Fund has mentioned the need for an 
income policy. It is lamentable, however, that 
despite its great experience it has not worked out 
such a policy and submitted it to debate in the 
appropriate fora. It has delayed doing so, per-
haps because it continues to regard peripheral 
inflation as a monetary problem, without prob-
ing into its deep-lying structural origin, that is, 
into the problems of the system's dynamic dis-
equilibrium. 
The other problem which we have examined 
in this article is the trend towards external 
dynamic disequilibrium in the development of 
the periphery. The conventional economists of 
the centres frequently continue to deny the ex-
istence of such a trend, influenced as they are by 
the concept of a system which makes for general 
equilibrium on the international plane as well. 
The ideas of these thinkers, as those of their 
counterparts in the peripheral countries, are 
strongly reminiscent of those concepts which 
were dominant in the days of the appendicular 
development of the periphery. The doors had to 
be opened wide to foreign capital and no (re-
putedly artificial) measures were to be taken to 
promote industrialization. 
It was then that a concept arose which, with-
out being explicit, was dominant in the days of 
appendicular development and still remains in 
force, as has been explained in another chapter. 
The centres were interested in peripheral de-
velopment only in so far as it served their own 
interests. 
This is the explanation of the opposition 
to peripheral industrialization. The idea was 
anathema to the centres at the very outset, es-
pecially where import substitution was con-
cerned, as we also remarked in the appropriate 
context. And on finally accepting industrializa-
tion as a fait accompli they recommended that the 
accent should rather be placed on exporting 
manufactures. And when the periphery was able 
to do this, the centres, far from adopting an 
attitude consonant with this recommendation, 
added new constraints and restrictions to those 
which they had maintained for a long time past. 
This is how the matter stands today, and yet 
there is a tendency to return to certain earlier 
ways of thinking against which we should be on 
our guard in time, because of their great signifi-
cance for our countries. 
I refer to the turn which is apparently being 
taken by the foreign policy of the United States. 
2. Significance of the United States' 
new economic policy 
This country is in the throes of an external dis-
equilibrium of growing dimensions, originating 
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in part in the overvaluation of its currency; this in 
turn is a result of the extraordinarily high inter-
est rates through which it is drawing off abun-
dant resources from the rest of the world in 
order to cover part of its fiscal deficit. 
T h e said overvaluation vigorously boosts 
United States imports and discourages its ex-
ports. But for one reason or another it chooses to 
correct the resulting external deficit not by 
means of fiscal or monetary adjustments but 
through direct measures concerning trade. 
Its aim is to encourage exports, particularly 
of technologically advanced goods, and likewise 
of services in which technical progress has also 
been highly intensive. And it underlines, at the 
same time, its intent to carry out this policy on 
bases of reciprocity, which means that the 
liberalization of trade with the restof the world in 
respect of those goods and services exported by 
the United States should be accompanied by the 
liberalization of its imports from these countries. 
There is talk at the moment about a new 
round of international negotiations on liberaliza-
tion similar to those which have been so success-
ful in the past in the trade of the centres. 
To embark on this subject would be to go 
beyond the scope of these reflections. I should 
merely like to refer to the significance of this new 
policy for the periphery. But first it would be well 
to recall the terms in which the problem of its 
trade with the centres is posed. 
In this trade there is a persistent trend to-
wards external imbalance which we have ex-
plained elsewhere: a structural trend different 
from the phenomenon which is now occurring in 
the United States. 
There are only two ways of correcting this 
imbalance, namely, an export expansion and im-
port substitution. The pace of the substitution 
does not depend on a doctrinaire preference but 
on the degree of receptivity of the centres to 
peripheral exports: this cannot be repeated too 
often. 
It would seem obvious that if the periphery 
complied with the United States' plan and 
o p e n e d its marke t s unreservedly to tech-
nologically advanced goods and services, in addi-
tion to others, the trend towards external im-
balance would be accentuated. In this case, in 
accordance with the principle of reciprocity, the 
United States and the other centres taking part in 
these international negotiations would have to 
liberalize imports from the periphery. In the 
rounds mentioned above, impressive reductions 
in tariffs were achieved which gave powerful im-
petus to trade between the centres, especially in 
goods deriving from technological innovations. 
The periphery, lacking such goods owing to the 
time-lag in its industrialization, was practically 
excluded from the liberalizing measures. 
Would the centres now be disposed to do 
away with the restrictions which for some time 
now have been obstructing imports of tech-
nologically less advanced goods from the periph-
ery? 
It is very doubtful that this would occur. Not 
only recently but for a long time now the centres 
have put obstacles in the way of imports from the 
periphery, even in periods when unemployment 
was low. In reality, the idea was to safeguard the 
surplus of the activities affected by lower import 
prices. Although this practice is at present only 
moderately applied, it could reach major pro-
portions, especially if respect for multilateral 
principles extended liberalization to the other 
developing regions. What is more, as long as the 
centres cannot achieve a substantial reduction in 
their current unemployment, such a radical 
change of attitude is scarcely conceivable. 
How could this problem be solved, or at least 
alleviated, without a radical attack on the dynam-
ic disequilibrium in the centres which produces 
structural unemployment? 
Would the centres really be prepared to 
accept peripheral competition of this kind? Or 
will they rather seek intermediate formulas to 
regulate this competition in accordance, at best, 
with a régime agreed upon with the periphery to 
promote the regular growth of imports without 
increasing unemployment, unless in a measure 
that could be absorbed? 
While acknowledging the impulse that such a 
process might give to exports of manufactures 
and of some agricultural products, I am far from 
believing that it would be sufficient to eliminate 
the cu r ren t imbalance and cover the ever-
increasing volume of imports which a rise in the 
r a t e o f p e r i p h e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t and the 
liberalization of its imports would imply. 
We must shun the illusion of assuming that to 
accept the liberalization of imports of advanced 
goods and services desired by the centres would 
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induce them to do their best to reciprocate in 
favour of imports from the periphery. I do not 
believe this would happen, except in the limited 
measure referred to, and, consequently, the pe-
riphery should continue its policy of import sub-
stitution. 
Indeed, the intensification of this policy is an 
imperative requisite of development, especially if 
its rate is to be increased. And the dimension it 
must achieve depends basically on the centres' 
receptivity to the goods exported by the pe-
ripheral countries. In other words, stimulation of 
the latter must be combined with progress in 
substitution. 
At this stage of the industrial evolution of the 
peripheral countries especially of the more ad-
vanced among them, it would be essential to car-
ry out this substitution process in larger markets 
than the national ones through production 
agreements between various countries and recip-
rocal trade. This also calls for new modus operandi, 
since those conceived a quarter of a century ago 
have.had only moderate success in achieving the 
positive results expected of them. 
All this has to be tackled from a dynamic 
standpoint. Both export expansion and import-
substituting industries will continue to bring with 
them an increase in technical and entrepreneur-
ial capacity which, by virtue of the surplus, will 
foster the development of industries with more 
advanced technology. In this way, the countries 
of the periphery, some sooner and others later, 
would gradually draw nearer to the trade pat-
terns of the centres. 
3. The doctrine of financial openness 
In addition to this opening-up of peripheral 
trade, the main dynamic centre preaches finan-
cial openness, i.e., the elimination of all restric-
tion on foreign investment and the functioning 
of the transnational corporations. 
It must not be overlooked that the trans-
nationals, in co-operation with the State and pri-
vate enterprise, could contribute to development 
in accordance with new rules of the game, that is, 
in line with a well-defined policy and with the 
requisites of development. 
Each peripheral country will have to decide 
which fields would benefit from the co-operation 
of the transnational» and which should be re-
served for local enterprise, either because the 
necessary technology has already been acquired 
or because there would be other effective means 
of gaining it. 
To yield to the doctrine of openness, above 
all in times of crisis like the present, would not 
only have adverse consequences, both economic 
and political, but would also block the way to the 
discovery of new formulas. Suffice it to recall 
that, if in the past we had given way to insistent 
pressures, we should not have been able to arrive 
at such formulas in a field as vital as petroleum. 
Here also there are signs of susceptibility to the 
influence of ideas corresponding to the aforesaid 
concept of appendicular development. 
In the periphery there have been great 
changes which call for an all-out drive towards 
integral development. This will require a pro-
gressive effort to overcome the technical in-
feriority by which appendicular development 
was characterized. 
If the doors were quite unconditionally 
opened wide to foreign imports and investment, 
this objective would be out of reach, since the 
technologically stronger industries of the centres 
would ultimately gain predominance, sapping 
the vigour of peripheral development. 
4. The fundamental coincidence of interests 
This does not concern the economy alone. These 
great changes are also of a political and cultural 
nature. The periphery is not isolated, but finds 
itself more and more under the influence of the 
political and cultural evolution of the centres and 
of the mass communication media in the in-
ternational sphere. Thus the process of de-
mocratization, with all it entails, goes on spread-
ing and interest in integrated development gains 
a firmer footing. 
We cannot turn back the clock either in rela-
tions with the centres or in internal development. 
The traces of appendicular development implicit 
in the insistence on unconditional openness in 
trade and finance must be eliminated once and 
for all. There was a reason for openness in trade 
when in the old pattern of the international divi-
sion of labour comparative advantages de-
termined the trading of primary products for 
manufactures. There were no comparative 
advantages in industrial goods simply because 
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there were no peripheral industries. Today these 
exist in a wide range of competitive goods. The 
fact that these goods have begun to make the 
centres' surplus externally vulnerable does not 
mean that no solutions can be found which, 
without causing serious trouble, will allow these 
comparative advantages to be enjoyed. 
There is, then, a convergence of interests. It 
existed likewise in appendicular development; 
but that lacked social depth. Integrated develop-
ment requires this deeper penetration and the 
discovery of new and promising formulas for 
coincidence of interests. 
For the first time in capitalism, the periphery 
might have dynamic influence over the centres 
through new and expanding patterns of trade. 
This also calls for an enlightened foreign 
investment policy which will help to raise the 
rate of peripheral development, since it would 
involve a continuous broadening of the field of 
comparative advantages. 
All this under the aegis of autonomous de-
velopment. Autonomy and coincidence of inter-
ests will give a firm base to the objective of political 
coexistence. We have to live side by side with the 
leading cen t re and the rest; this is an in-
controvertible fact. The intensity of its develop-
ment is of vital importance for the periphery. 
5. Monetary and financial indiscipline 
This coexistence based on certain coincidence of 
interest will not be an easy matter. The trans-
national banks afford a clear case in point. When 
there was copious international liquidity in the 
Eurodollar market the financial power of the 
transnational banks was fully dominant. The 
IMF and the World Bank —State institutions— 
remained on the sidelines of international credit 
operations; in the days of euphoria it was in-
sistently proclaimed that the private transnation-
a l , acting independently, would be effective 
agents of resource allocation in the international 
field. Quite to the contrary, however, there was 
irresponsibility, which was shared by the debtor 
countries. The profit incentive led these trans-
nationals to disregard elementary norms of pru-
dence and foresight. 
T h e problem, of course, goes very deep and 
it will be helpful to give a brief account of its more 
important aspects. Its origin lies in the fiscal and 
monetary policy of the leading dynamic centre. 
The anti-inflationary policy now pursued by the 
United States is the current inverse of the infla-
tion that had been occurring for some time past, 
and was accentuated later by the rise in oil prices; 
and this inflation in its turn is the clear expres-
sion of the dynamic disequilibrium in the United 
States economy, which is mainly evidenced in the 
fiscal deficit. The deficit is largely due to the 
social and military expenditure of the State. And 
the reluctance to meet these by taxation and re-
duced spending has caused the government to 
resort to domestic savings and to attracting ex-
ternal resources by means of colossally high in-
terest rates. Such is the well-known picture. 
Within this picture, there is growing concern 
over the increasing amount of the external im-
balance. For the first time since before the First 
World War the United States has become a debt-
or, and the burden of interest is tending to 
swell the fiscal deficit to an alarming extent. 
There is also anxiety about the external con-
sequences of these phenomena. It fact, the im-
balance is severely hampering the recovery of the 
European economy, since it would seem to be 
increasing the flight of dollars; in addition to the 
effects provoked by the United States through 
high interest rates. 
These interest rates cause growing difficul-
ties for the debtor countries of the periphery, 
all the more so as their exports are increasingly 
hard hit by the crisis in the centres and the recru-
descence of their protectionism. 
It is inconceivable that this can continue with-
out driving the other centres, as well as the 
periphery, to the adoption of very drastic mea-
sures of defence and leading to a complete break-
down of multilateralism, as happened in con-
sequence of the policy followed by the United 
States in face of the great world depression. 
The correction of the Fiscal deficit of the 
Uni ted States would make possible an ex-
pansionist policy in the countries affected; but at 
the same time it would create new problems 
which we cannot ignore. 
What would be the international effects of a 
fall in interest rates? Can we assume that the 
abundant resources that have flowed into the 
United States will stay there? Or will liquidation 
of the investment of these resources supervene, 
bringing with it a reverse movement of return? 
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If this last were to happen it would pose other 
questions : would the value of the debt be guaran-
teed in order to ward off or moderate the return? 
If so, would dollars be created again so as to cover 
this return? Or would the United States have to 
turn to IMF, which would need to resort to new 
sources of funds on account of not having 
enough in hand? 
At all events, there could be a recurrence of 
excessive international monetary liquidity. This 
would provide an opportunity to learn from the 
lessons of the past in order to avoid the same 
mistakes. We ought not to give new impetus to 
the Eurocurrency market by foregoing any sort 
of regulation. 
This incentive is generally efficacious in pro-
ductive activity, but it has serious consequences 
when transferred to the monetary field. The 
creation of money needs to be regulated on the 
international plane likewise; but the private 
banks resisted every attempt at regulation; and to 
the dollars originating in the United States' infla-
tion was added their inflationary multiplication 
on the Eurodollar market. Hence the problem of 
the debt is essentially a political problem: it is 
essential to correct what was lightly permitted 
before. 
Again, the continuance of high interest rates 
and the suction of international resources might 
have very serious repercussions, in particular for 
the debtor countries. With a view to remedying 
their lack of foresight the private banks are 
requiring that the debtors compress their im-
ports in order to pay their heavy interest rates 
and this involves the compression of the whole 
economy, owing to a theoretical attitude opposed 
to a selective import policy. At all events, the 
increasingly heavy burden of debt servicing is 
severely cramping development and hampering 
economic expansion. All this has its limit and that 
limit is very near. It will be well to take care that it 
is not exceeded. Accordingly, there is a pressing 
need to find a political solution. 
The resources of this possible increase in 
liquidity might be tapped through the issue of 
securities destined, in the first place, to the long-
term postponement at low rates of interest of the 
periphery's oppressive debt; and secondly, to 
meet the inescapable need to contribute to the 
recovery of the peripheral economies, prostrated 
as they are by the effects of the crisis. In each case 
the liquid resources would return to the centres 
in payment of debts or exports. 
We are all waiting to see what the United 
States will do. But we cannot wait indefinitely 
without taking our own measures of defence and 
constructive adaptation. In the course of my long 
life I have witnessed in person and sometimes 
had to take action against the adverse effects of 
the vicissitudes of the centres: the great depres-
sion, the Second World War and the postwar 
period, the inflationary euphoria and its in-
ternational spill-over. And now against the con-
sequences of the anti-inflationary policy of the 
main dynamic centre. 
I have also witnessed the great achievements 
of this centre; the Marshall Plan, the support for 
the European Payments Union, for the Eu-
ropean Economic Community and also for the 
Alliance for Progress, which came to grief soon 
after its birth. Great vision and creative inspira-
tion, such as are needed in these days likewise. 
They are needed also by the periphery to grapple 
with its serious problems. Vision and creative 
inspiration, which is slow in coming everywhere. 
